My aim in this Lecture is to explore an ambivalence of law and of legal theory concerning rationality. The ambivalence I will discuss is one between rationality, narrowly defined as the maximization of an agent's self-interest, and benevolence, broadly understood as behavior that moderates the pursuit of one's self-interest by taking into account the interests of other individuals or of the community as a whole. I will look at two actors, the central heroes of the legal drama: the subjects of law, more particularly the ordinary people who are the focus of private law, and the carriers of law, centering on judges, on whom legal theory places much of its spotlight.
INTRODUCTION
My aim in this Lecture is to explore an ambivalence of law and of legal theory concerning rationality. The ambivalence I will discuss is one between rationality, narrowly defined as the maximization of an agent's self-interest, and benevolence, broadly understood as behavior that moderates the pursuit of one's self-interest by taking into account the interests of other individuals or of the community as a whole. I will look at two actors, the central heroes of the legal drama: the subjects of law, more particularly the ordinary people who are the focus of private law, and the carriers of law, centering on judges, on whom legal theory places much of its spotlight.
My first task in this Lecture is descriptive. I will show how law assumes its subjects' rationality and also seeks to transcend it. I will also demonstrate how legal theory presents a mirror-image of this seeming paradox insofar as judges are concerned: while it expects judges to transcend their self-and group-interest, it suspects that this ideal neither will nor can be perfectly attained. These attitudes may at first glance seem confusing, if not confused, hence my second task, which is to explain and ultimately celebrate these ambivalences. My third and final task is to sketch the complex ways by which law and legal theory face the challenge of sustaining these happy ambivalences.
I. TWO PUZZLES
Law's conventional story assumes that its subjects are rational maximizers of their self-interest, 1 and that its carriers are benevolent servants of the public good. And yet, at the same time, we can also easily trace within legal discourse the opposite assumptions.
A. Rational But Potentially Benevolent Citizens
I first consider law's conception of its subjects focusing on private law (the laws of property, contracts, torts, and restitution) because private law structures our daily interactions as individuals more than any other part of our law. Law clearly anticipates a subject who rationally maximizes her self-interest. Subjects with such a disposition need, for example, a proper incentive if they are to engage in creative activity at a socially desirable level. Without such a legal incentive in place, creative resources may be undersupplied because the expected costs of their production tend to be high while the costs of their copying, which may turn the copier into a competitor, are rather low. Hence one of the conventional accounts of intellectual property law as a set of carefully-designed carrots that encourage creative activity.
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By the same token, much of the law of remedies can be analyzed as a legal design aimed at discouraging rational subjects from engaging in activities that are either socially detrimental or incompatible with other people's entitlements. This analysis is obviously acceptable to lawyer-economists, but should also be so to those who hold that our private law entitlements, at least partly, are not grounded in welfarist concerns, as long as they acknowledge that many of the potential 1 Or sub-rational due to difficulties such as imperfect information, cognitive errors, and the like, which are irrelevant to my interest here. 2 14 Similarly, law's expectation that its subjects will act in accordance with its normative legal reasons also clarifies why the duties that negligence law imposes are specified in terms of reasonable conduct, implying that persons engaged in risky acts should take into account the interests of those they put at risk. 
B. Benevolent but Potentially Self-Interested Judges
Legal theory's portrayal of its main subjects is a mirror image of the one we have just traced insofar as the subjects of law are concerned. Much of legal theory, mostly from its jurisprudential side, conceives of law's carriers as selfless, namely, as the voice of public-regarding reasons or considered judgments about the common good, as opposed to preferences that reflect their self-interest or the interests of the sub-group to which they belong. 16 But numerous accounts surrounding this "official story," ranging from critical legal studies to political science and economics, are suspicious of the judges' alliance with their self-and group-interest, and tend to portray them as Holmesian rational maximizers. reject the idea that law is or can be a self-regulating system of concepts and rules, a machine that in run-of-the-mill cases simply runs itself. 20 These theorists highlight the doctrinal indeterminacy generated by the multiplicity of sources 16 Notice that while I (deliberately) use the term "reason" in a rather minimalist sense, this sense is still sufficiently distinct from preferences. Reasons are judged by their cogency as per the public interest. Preferences, by contrast, are at bottom about selfinterest and are accordingly weighted by the intensity with which they are held. Finally, Benkler observes that, whether these differences are "innate, acquired, or mixed," the evidence "supports the proposition that these behavioral patterns are situational," namely, they can be affected by the pertinent institutional context.
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The ambivalence of law and legal theory documented above should be understood with this human heterogeneity in mind. More specifically, given this complexity, both the baseline assumptions of law regarding judges and citizens, as well as the fact that their corresponding opposites always accompany the portrayals of these heroes of the legal drama, are well-justified. of legal theory is justified as a baseline because it is part of a cultural and institutional structure which strengthens our expectations that judges will transcend their self-and group-interest and will serve the public good. Legal theorists as well as ordinary citizens should, by and large, remain indifferent between judges' intrinsic pursuit of the common good and their instrumental desire for the high regard of their peers and friends. What should matter most for us all is that judges behave as if they were benevolent Vulcans, trying to be good judges, and devoting time and effort to carefully and impartially deciding cases and developing the law so that it will indeed vindicate people's rights and promote the public good.
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Law's opposite baseline regarding its subjects being rational maximizers of their self-interest is also easy to understand and justify. While liberals realize that true autonomy requires collective goods 37 that often require people to behave benevolently, a liberal society must assume and, as far as possible must also ensure, that these communal goods and pursuits are aspects of individual selffulfillment. 38 Neither the associations to which we belong nor the other-regarding commitments we undertake should erase our individual identity. Associations and commitments may be constitutive of people's identity, but each one should be able to decide whether and for how long to remain within them. This is true because of the crucial role that geographical, social, familial, and political mobility play in the preservation of individual freedom, 39 and also because, at least partly, the value of such other-regarding commitments and collective associations is due to the fact that they are realized through voluntary choice-if not ex-ante, then at least ex- post. 40 Thus, a broad assumption of rationality sets an appropriate baseline for a society committed to allow its citizens to pursue their own individual conception of the good.
But neither baseline should exhaust our attitude towards law's carriers and law's subjects and, therefore, their "underground" accounts are also significant.
Thus, it is justified to be suspicious of the ability and inclination of judges to transcend their self-and group-interests, and it is therefore imperative to constantly remember that the ideal of selfless adjudication is a benchmark that is seldom perfectly attained. Legal theory should beware of the complacent portrayal of adjudication as purely a public-regarding institutional service, and constantly guard against such self-serving (and at times self-deluding) judicial judgments.
Challenging the canon's romantic account is particularly important given the subtle ways in which law's power manifests itself. Law's coerciveness is not exhausted by the obvious fact that, unlike other judgments, those prescribed by law's carriers can recruit the state's monopolized power to back up their enforcement. It also has manifestations that are far more elusive, founded on institutional and discursive means that tend to downplay at least some of the dimensions of law's power. Among the most notable are the institutional division of labor between "interpretation specialists" (read: judges) and the actual executors of their judgments, as well as our tendency to "thingify" legal constructs and accord them an aura of obviousness and acceptability. At the same time, these legal realists never reduced law to "brute power," nor did they dismiss the judges' reliance on an "element of recognition" so that it is indeed "in tune with the net requirements of the Entirety." 47 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Instead of summarizing my claims, I want to conclude this Lecture with a comment that accords with the interdisciplinary emphasis of this distinguished Series, in which I am honored to participate. Most of the time, when legal academics talk about interdisciplinarity, they mean using a theoretical discipline from the social sciences or from the humanities for the analysis of law. 48 The intellectual openness to law's neighboring disciplines is certainly imperative. The subtext implicit in these pronouncements, however, whereby no significant theoretical lesson intrinsic to law that is important for legal theory could also be potentially enriching to these neighboring disciplines, is in my view both wrong and unfortunate. This is obviously a broad issue that I will not attempt to discuss here. 49 But I hope that my foray into the way law and legal theory conceptualize the human subjects they address demonstrates at least two of the potential contributions of legal research to the social sciences, as identified recently by Chris McCrudden. 50 First, while economics and sociology often accept legal rules and concepts "as a datum, as fact, unproblematic and one-dimensional," legal research shows, 20 McCrudden claims, that legal norms and concepts are "likely to be complex, nuanced and contested." As we have seen, this complexity is true not only regarding law's obvious products-rules and concepts-but also regarding the human nature that law reflects.
Second, and even more significantly, McCrudden argues that many social scientists fail to appreciate the role that law plays "in the social and economic phenomena they are attempting to analyse." Law, he maintains, never "simply reflect[s] social context, but also shapes it," and "many of the ideas and categories through which we understand the world are in part legally determined." The role of rationality and benevolence in the lives of both citizens and judges is no exception. Therefore, legal research cannot content itself with the undoubtedly important and challenging task of adjusting legal doctrines to the social scientific findings regarding the pertinent actors' motivational-behavioral profiles. Rather, we must always also ask what is the normatively desirable human attitude for the pertinent setting, and whether law and legal theory can prescribe institutional arrangements that nurture such an attitude. 51 51 I use the word "nurture" here deliberately in order to flag to the possible role not only of law but also of legal theory and legal education in generating the proper attitudes about our institutions.
